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SUMMARY
This paper discusses the value of -foreign exchange in Zimbabwe, a 
central element in government s project appraisal and other 
planning efforts, and a major determinant of the level and 
distribution of income and incentives throughout the economy. To 
quantity changes over time in this value, the paper uses the real 
exchange rate (RER) approach, comparing changes in the prices of 
tradable and nontradable goods over time.
In the paper, the theory behind the RER approach is summarized, 
and the available data are presented. It is shown that, since 
the introduction of the current exchange control system after 
UD1, the prices of traded goods (imports and exports) in Zimbabwe 
have declined sharply, relative to the prices of building 
materials and other non-tradable goods. This decline has reduced 
the incentives to produce exports, worsened the shortage of 
forex, slowed growth in the economy, and reduced the incomes of 
ail potential producers of exports, including many communal 
farmers.
To restore the earlier incentives to export, the value of forex 
would have to be about 50"/. above the current official exchange 
rate. This implies that the current exchange rate "taxes" 
exports by about 50V. of current revenue. For the agricultural 
sector, the total amount is on the order of half a billion 
dollars, representing a net transfer out of agriculture fat- 
larger than the entire budget of the Ministry of Lands, 
Agriculture and Rural Resettlement.
In official project appraisals, a foreign exchange premium of 50% 
would compensate for the "exchange rate tax." However, this 
would affect onlv government-control led investments. To assist 
private-sector exporters, special programmes such as the Export 
Revolving Fund and the Export Incentive Scheme are useful, but 
tail to reach communal-area farmers and other dispersed, 
relatively low-input, labour-intensive producers of exportables. 
To reach them, a macroeconomic policy to raise the real exchange 
rate is needed. Such a policy could improve both the level and 
distribution o+ income, through accelerated increases in the 
official exchange rate combined with reduced domestic 
inflationary pressures from opening up production bottlenecks and 
reducing excess credit creation.
A methodological appendix to the paper presents the major 
alternative approaches to estimating the value of foreign 
exchange. The theory and data requirements of each method are 
discussed, along with their app1icabi1ity to Zimbabwe.
1. Introduction
The value of -foreign exchange in Zimbabwe, de-fined as the 
increase in national income obtained -from each extra pula, pound 
or U. S. dollar, na-s y. strong influence on the costs and benefits 
of many activities. It is particularly important for the 
agricultural sector, which currently provides over a billion 
dollars annually in exports (almost half of Zimbabwe's total), 
using only around $ 1 0 0 million in imported inputs (less than 1 0% 
of total imports) . 1
If there is any difference between the official exchange rate and 
the value of forex for the economy, that difference (the forex 
"premium") will be an implicit tax on exporters and subsidy to 
importers. In this paper, data are presented estimating the 
current forex premium at about 50%, which represents a transfer 
out of the farm sector that is at least as big as the entire $350 
million annual vote for the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and 
Rural Resettlement.® In agriculture, as in other sectors, the exchange rate tax weighs heavily against the. government' s equity 
and growth objectives.
The government can compensate for this tax in its project 
appraisals and other public-sector plannning efforts, by valuing 
imports and exports at above their market prices. But a common 
forex premium should be used in all appraisals, for projects to 
be compared on an equal basis. Currently there is little 
agreement on that premium, which can range from zero, if the 
issue is ignored completely, to infinitely large, if only net 
forex earnings are consifered important. The Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Rlannir.g and Development has recently *
x. Calculated from 1987 data in C30, Quarterly Digest of Statistics (March 1989), Tables 11.5 and 11.6, on which 
agricultural exports total about $900 million while imports of 
agricultural inputs (including a quarter of all fuel and 
vehicles) total about $100 million. This contrasts with total 
exports of $1 900 million, and total imports of $1 700 million. 
Figures for 1988 and 1989 will be much higher, as the 1987 
harvest was generally poor. Note that agricultural exports 
include non-farm value added in processing and transport, which 
has not been subtracted, from the value of exports of agr icu.l tural oriqin.
Note that most of this budget, well over $200 million annually, goes to subsidies on agricultural commodities and loans 
to marketing boards. The benefits from these subsidies are 
shared amongst consumers and producers, thus reducing the 
producers share of the MLARR budget. In addition, the benefits 
from subsidies are concentrated among, those who market the most, 
whicn further reduces the small farmer s share. And finally, the 
largest,subsidies are on beef and dairy, which are almost 
entirely produced on large commercial farms. The communal sub- 
sector s share of the MLARR budget is relatively small.
recommended a premium of 1 0 0‘/., judging that -forex contributes 
twice as much to total Zimbabwean income as indicated by the 
official exchange rate <MFEF'D, 1988). In contrast, the World 
Bank s most recent Industrial Sector Memorandum recommended a 
premium of 40% <World Bank, 1987).
To -find agreement on an estimate o-f the value of foreign 
exchange, a common set of terms with which to discuss the issue 
is needed, along with a common set of data which with which to quantify those terms. This paper attempts to assist on both 
counts, by presenting the most useful concepts of the value of 
forex used in the economics literature, and applying them to the 
available data in Zimbabwe. 3 The paper concludes with a review of the causes and implications of the estimated forex premium. A 
methodological appendix is attached, detailing a number of 
alternative approaches and discussing the influence of the terms 
of trade on the value of foreign exchange.
2. The exchange rate and the value o-f -foreign exchange
In Zimbabwe as in most other countries, exchange rates are 
typically defined as an amount of foreign currency per unit of 
domestic currency, for example Botswana pula per Zimbabwe dollar 
<p/Z$). This is usually what is meant by the "value of the 
Zimbabwe dollar," expressed in terms of foreign currency such as 
pulas. Thus, when the p/Z$ rate falls, the Zimbabwe dollar 
"depreciates" or is "devalued".
It is, however, equally possible to define the exchange rate the 
other way around, that is, as Z$/p. This is usually what is 
meant by the "value of forex," expressed in terms of the Zimbabwe 
dollar. Thus, when the p/Z$ rate falls and the Zimbabwe dollar 
depreciates, the Z$/p rate and the “value of forex" rises. In 
this paper, the "exchange rate" will generally be quoted as p/Z$, 
but the "value of forex" will be Z$/p.
Whether one is speaking of the p/Z$ "exchange rate," or the Z$/p 
"value of forex," the crucial distinctions are between the 
alternative ways in which the foreign exchange is used, leading 
to different definitions of the exchange rate and the value of 
forex.
s. No attempt is made here to discuss in detail the Zimbabwean system of foreign exchange allocation. This is done 
in many sources within Zimbabwe, and for foreign readers a 
concise summary is given by the International Monetary Fund's 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions Annual Report.
2.1 Prices, opportunity costs, and rents
The exchange rate is >!>e relative price of -foreign versus 
domestic currency, and is therefore a major influence on the 
relative prices of all foreign versus domestic goods. There are 
many other influences on the price of any one good, but the 
exchange rate remains a major aggregate or macroeconomic price 
acting on the economy as a whole. As such the exchange rate can, 
with some limitations, be considered as if it were the price of a 
single aggregate item: "foreign" versus "domestic" goods.
An item s market price, however, is not necessarily its true 
economic value."* Economic value is reckoned in terms of opportunity cost, which is the item's value (in the sense of 
total benefits minus total costs) in its next best alternative 
use. This concept applies most generally to the values of 
particular goods, but can also apply, with some limitations, to 
aggregate prices such as the exchange rate.
Each item has two opportunity costs: the value of resources
required to produce it (the marginal cost of production, or its 
opportunity-cost "selling price"), and the benefits obtained from 
consuming it (the consumers' total willingness and ability to pay 
for the item, or its opportunity-cost "buying price"). In the 
case of the exchange rate, "producers" are net earners of foreign 
exchange, people making exports and import-substitutes, while 
"consumers" are net users of these items. The two opportunity 
costs are not fixed prices, but limits on prices: producers
(exporters) would be happy to sell (export) for more than their 
opportunity costs, while consumers (importers) would be happy to 
pay less for their purchases (imports).
Each producer and consumer nas a unique opportunity cost, 
determined by his or her particular situation and preferences.
The opportunity costs of all producers make up the economy s 
opportunity-cost supply curve, while the opportunity costs of 
consumers make up the opportunity-cost demand curve. At each 
level,of quantity produced and consumed, there is a distinct 
marginal opportunity cost for producers and consumers, along 
their supply and demand curves —  and the economy-wide 
opportunity cost is the higher of the two. At an economic 
equilibrium, the two curves meet and opportunity costs in 
production and consumption are equalized. This is what is 
usually meant by "the" opportunity cost of an item.
Occasionally, however, a opportunity-cost buying price will be 4
4 . This paper will consider only economic values, adding up material costs and benefits both for particular groups and for 
Zimbabwe as a whole ("national" income). Non-economic values 
such as national prestige are obviously important as well, but 
are not the domain of economists and will not be covered here.
4distinguished from an opportunity-cost selling price, or the 
opportunity costs of different individuals may be compared.
Opportunity costs can either be private, considering only the 
costs and benefits for an individual producer or consumer, or 
they can be national, adding up costs and benefits for everyone 
in the country, consumers and producers alike. Sometimes, 
national oppportunity costs include the possibility of changing 
certain policies, such as removing price controls or the minimum 
wage. For the purposes of this paper, however, all laws and 
regulations are taken for granted unles? otherwise stated. Thus, 
the value.of foreign exchange needed for this paper is its 
national opportunity cost, given all current conditions.
The difference between market prices and opportunity costs is 
important because the difference between them, if any, is a 
transfer amongst Zimbabweans. That transfer can go to or from 
the government (as a tax or subsidy), or more often, to and from 
other producers and consumers (as a "rent"). In this paper, 
transfer through the exchange rate will be referred to as the 
"exchange rate tax," because the government sets the exchange 
rate. When the government sets the local-currency price of forex 
below its opportunity cost, the difference is transferred from 
the many current and potential net earners of forex (producers of 
exports and import-substitutes), to the smaller number of people 
who are net consumers of these goods at controlled prices. This 
exchange-rate tax is probably the largest such transfer in the 
Zimbabwean economy, but it is well hidden and easy to overlook.
2.2 The official exchange rate
The vast majority of forex transactions take place at the 
official exchange rate (OER), which is published every day in the 
newspapers. At the OER, the value of forex is about one dollar 
to the Botswana pula, or three dollars to the U.K. pound.= But at this rate people want to buy much more forex than they want to 
sell: Zimbabweans opportunity-cost buying price is above the
Note that, from Zimbabwe s point of view,- the exchange 
rates amongst convertible (or "hard") currencies are fixed.
Thus, the p/Z$ rate will always be twice the US$/Z$ rate and 
three times the UK/Z$ rate, as long as the p/US$ rate stays at 
2,0 and the p/UK rate stays at 3,0. There is very little scope 
for Zimbabwe to avoid this, since holders of any hard currency 
can easily switch into any other hard currency. In contrast, 
Zimbabwe could set exchange rates with non-convertible 
currencies, such as the Zambian kwacha or Kenyan shilling, 
bilaterally with those countries since holders of these 
currencies have no other option. But most trade is carried out 
in hard currencies;, so bilateral exchange rates would have little 
significance for the economy as a whole.
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official price, so there is excess demand and a severe shortage 
of foreign exchange.
To allocate scarce foreign exchange, official transactions are 
regulated toy a strict system of export and import licenses. 
Exporters must ototain an export license and surrender all foreign 
exchange proceeds to, the Reserve Bank, which converts it into 
Zimbabwe dollars at the OER. Then, those who wish to spend forex 
on imports must obtain an import license issued by the Reserve 
Bank, usually on the instructions of the Ministry of Trade and 
Commerce (for merchandise imports) or the Ministry of Industry 
and Technology (for industrial imports). These are given to 
particular firms for the import of particular items, mostly under 
regulations gazetted during the UDI period (1965-79).
In practice, most exporters would prefer to keep their foreign 
exchange rather than surrender it at the OER, while importers 
would be willing and able to pay much more than the OER.
Zimbabwe s opportunity cost value of forex is therefore clearly 
above the official rate; there is an exchange rate tax on those 
who earn foreign exchange, and an associated subsidy to those who 
use it.
2.3 The parallel-market exchange rate
One indication of the magnitude of the exchange rate tax is given 
by the black- or parallel-market exchange rate (PER). This is 
the price at which individuals seeking to buy or sell foreign 
exchange unofficially must do so. But foreign exchange controls 
are exceptionally well enforced in Zimbabwe.* This makes the 
parallel market thin and allows a wide range of PER s to exist at 
one time. People who are more desperate to buy forex will pay 
more. In general, however, the black-market value of forex is 
about twice its official price, indicating a forex premium of 
around 1007.. One pula costs two Zimbabwe dollars, one pound 
costs seven or eight dollars, etc. * 7
From the point of view of an individual who is willing to break 
the law, the PER is a potential opportunity-cost buying price of 
foreign exchange. But not only is the parallel market thin and
. In 1988, there were 306 recorded offences of the exchange control laws, and 965 offenses of the associated customs 
and excise rules, for a total' of 1271 violations of trade 
controls. In contrast, there were only 461 recorded cases of 
armed robbery. For details, see CSO, Quarterly Digest of 
Statistics (March 1989).
7. This can be seen in occasional newspaper reports on the issue, such as "Expats in Big Forex Racket: Claim" (The 
Chronicle. 8 November 1989, p. 7).
6uncertain, it also contains three influence^ which consistently 
raise the value of ■foreign exchange above its economy-wide 
opportunity cost.
Firstly, there is a large transactions cost and a high risk 
factor, because Zimbabwe does impose heavy fines and even 
imprisonment on both buyers and sellers when they are caught.
Thus finding a person with whom to exchange is not always easy, 
and both buyer and seller must be compensated for their risks.
The resulting transactions costs and risk premium raise the price 
of forex both directly through the buyer paying a higher Z$/puia 
rate, and indirectly through driving away sellers which makes 
black-market forex, more scarce.
Secondly, a large share of the parallel market consists of people 
buying items which are exceptionally scarce or expensive in 
Zimbabwe, such as motor spares or luxury goods. These would be a 
smaller proportion of total trade, and have a smaller influence 
on the economy-wide value of forex. But they dominate the black 
market, so their high local prices have a disproportionate 
influence on the black-market forex premium.
Thirdly, a major share of the parallel market consists of capital 
movements. In official transact ions, these can be separated from 
trade to some extent, thus insulating the markets for goods and 
services from the inflow and outflow of capital. This 
distinction is discussed in more detail in the appendix. On the 
parallel market, the two markets are joined: a taxi operator in
Bulawayo needing auto parts from Francistown must buy pula or 
rands from the same source as a farmer intending to emigrate to 
South Africa. And since there is continuing out-migration,m plus financial pressures for an outflow of capital, this further 
depreciates the PER.*’
In conclusion, the simple fact that the parallel market is 
illegal makes black-market foreign exchange seem more valuable 
than it really is: the opportunity cost of forex is somewhat
lower than suggested by the PER. The forex premium/exchange rate
. Official migration statistics are given in CSO, Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics. For both 1987 and 1988, net 
outflow stood at around 1 400, down from the highs of 10 000 to 
12 000 each year between 1978 and 1984.
%  An interesting and less often noted aspect of the 
parallel exchange rate is that it usually settles on a round 
number. Here, the pressure for an outflow of Zimbabwe dollars 
can be expected to lead sellers to round down, which further 
depreciates the currency. This effect was pointed out by Prof. 
Ulrich Koester of the University of Kiel.
7tax, therefore, is somewhere between 0 (at the OER itself) and 
100V. (at the PER) .
2.4 The real exchange rateTo estimate the level of the forex premium, a number of 
alternative methods have been developed. This paper will apply 
the most recent and most relevant of these approaches: the real 
exchange rate (RER) method. 10 This approach is summarized here, while the major alternative approaches are detailed in the 
methodological appendix.
The RER approach is based on the idea that there are two kinds of 
goods in the economy: tradable ones, such as wheat or
refrigerators, which could be bought or sold elsewhere using 
foreign currency, and nontradable ones, such as ordinary 
vegetables or building sand, which cannot, usually because their 
transport costs are too high. The central insight of this idea 
is that the exchange rate influences the domestic prices of all 
tradables, both exports and imports, relative to the 
nontradables. When the exchange rate and the prices of tradables 
rise, the quantity of exports rises and the quantity of imports 
fails, yielding more foreign exchange. This shows how a country 
can improve its own balance of paymen.ts, without waiting for an 
inflow of foreign capital or an improvement in its terms of 
trade.
■Since the " tradab i 1 i tv “ of a good usually depends on its 
transport costs relative to its domestic and foreign values, it 
is common for goods to change their status over time. In
This approach uses what is sometimes known as the "Australian model" of. trade, in which the economy consists of 
three sectors: exportables, importables, and non-tradables.
This model was initiated by Salter (1959), Swan (1960), and 
Corden (1960), and brought into the current policy analysis 
literature with Dornbusch (1974) and Sjaastad (1980). In the 
1980s, it has been applied in numerous studies of a wide range of 
countries. These were pioneered by a series of analyses 
undertaken at the International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI), summarized in Valdes (1986). The IFPR1 series includes 
Garcia (1981) on Colombia, pyedije (1986) on Nigeria, Tshibaka 
(1986) on Zaire, and Bautista (1987) on the Philippines. More 
recently, there is a series of studies under way at the Kiel 
Institute of World Economics, including Weibelt (1989) and 
Herrmann, Sulaiman and Weibelt (1989). Work, in Zimbabwe was 
pioneered by Mlambo (1989). Related research,in the region 
includes a cross-country comparative study for Africa by Schafer 
(1988), and a series of studies at the World Bank summarized in 
Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988), incorporating Jansen (1988) on 
Zambia.
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Zimbabwe -for example, high-quality -flowers are now strong export 
products. But even a small rise in transport costs, or a small 
reduction in European -flower prices, would cause the trade to 
become unprofitable, and flowers would again become nontradable.
In addition, since nontradable goods use varying amounts of 
tradable inputs and may also be partial substitutes for tradable 
products, the degree of price transmission from tradables to 
nontradables varies amongst nontradable goods. For example, 
transport services are not tradable and have no tradable 
substitutes. But their costs consist largely of fuel and 
machinery, which are highly tradable—  so if the exchange rate 
rises, transport costs will rise as well. In contrast, ordinary 
vegetables such as tomatoes or spinach are normally not tradable, 
and their costs consist mostly of equally nontradable labour and 
land. Thus their price will be much less affected by the 
exchange rate. 11
Despite the variability amongst different items, in general 
changes in the exchange rate will have a lower and more delayed 
impact on the prices of nontradables than tradables. Thus, a 
“real" exchange rate within the economy can be calculated as the 
relative price in local currency of these two types of goods.
This is usually defined as the ratio of an index of tradables' 
prices (Pti) over an index of nontradables prices (Pnti)s13
RERit s Pti* /Pnti*
Any changes in this REP index show year-to-year changes in the value of tradables in terms of nontradables. Since an 
incremental unit of tradables would save (or earn) a unit of 
foreign exchange, the RER can also be taken as the economy-wide 
value of foreign exchange in terms of domestic currency, as 1%/p. 
When the RER index rises, it becomes more profitable to produce
11. It is possible to measure the average amount of price transmission from tradables (especially imports) to nontradables. 
The 1FPRI studies summarised in Valdes (1986) focus on this 
question, finding that a 1 0‘; rise in the average prices of 
importables would raise the prices of nontradables by an average 
of 6-8%. Similar results were reported for Zimbabwe in Mlambo 
(1989), for Peru in Valdes and Leon (1987), and for Peru and 
Malaysia in Herrmann, Sulaiman and Weibelt (1989). The amount of 
price transmission, however, depends very much on the items 
involved. Some nontradables would have a smaller, and others a 
higher, response to changing import prices.
Here the s symbol is used to indicate an identity, showing that this equation is a definition, rather than a 
prediction.
exports and import-substitutes, and less desirable to consume 
them. Thus the gu-ntity of exports rises, and the quantity of 
imports -falls, improving the trade balance. This relationship is 
very strong, as has been repeatedly shown in studies throughout 
the world. 13
The prices and opportunity costs of all tradable goods are much 
influenced by' their value in trades their foreign-currency price, 
after paying all marketing and transport costs, divided by the 
exchange rate. This price, although it applies directly only to 
items actually traded, is then transmitted to similar goods on 
the domestic market by substitution in both demand and supply. 
Thus changes in the border prices of traded goods change the 
prices and the opportunity costs of all tradables, whether or hot 
they are actually traded.
Because the traded items foreign-currency prices are determined 
in -foreign countries, . where there are many other potential buyers 
and sellers o-f the good, it is usually impossible for Zimbabwe to 
affect that -price. * 4 Thus, from Zimbabwe s point of view, the 
local value of tradables can be influenced only through the 
exchange rate. The price or opportunity-cost value of any given 
tradable (Pt) in Zimbabwe dollars is roughly the good's foreign 
price <Pf) divided by the official exchange rate (GER, in terms 
of p/ZS):
Pt - Pf/QER
For nontradables, on the other hand, prices and opportunity costs 
are determined within the country, based on internal supply and 
demand. These are somewhat affected by the exchange rate, 
because all goods use some tradable inputs, or may be substitutes 
for tradables in production or consumption, but the influence is 
indirect and therefore smaller than it is for tradables. Most 
yeat— to-year changes in Pnt are due to changing domestic 
conditions.
In Zimbabwe, almost all tradable goods (and many nontradables as 
well) are subject to enforced price controls. Many agricultural 134
13. A particularly clear presentation in in Bornbusch and Leslle (1988).
14. Zimbabwe can sometimes obtain short-term concessionary trade arrangements, such as for beef to Europe, or sugar to the 
U.S., covering limited quantities only. To influence marginal 
prices Zimbabwe would need some control over the total quantities 
of a good being traded worldwide. But Zimbabwe is a small 
country, whose exports even in tobacco or other specialties are 
well under a tenth of world trade. Thus Zimbabwe s influence over prices is small.
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products also receive large government subsidies. But changes in 
domestic prices, even for controlled goods, generally follow 
changes in border prices. Most price controls, including those 
on all imported agricultural chemicals and equipment, are 
calculated on a cost-plus basis. This gives sellers a fixed 
markup over border prices and other costs, ensuring that any 
changes in border prices are almost immediately passed on to the 
domestic market. Other price controls, including prices for 
fertilisers, seeds, and most farm products, are determined on a 
fixed-price basis. In these cases there may be delays in price 
adjustments, but eventually domestic prices have tended to follow 
their opportunity costs. Large deviations result in severe 
shortages or large stock build-ups, so that they rarely persist 
for more than two or three years. Thus, domestic prices for 
tradables have tended to follow border-price opportunity costs, 
and movements in the opportunity-cost RER index can be taken to 
reflect changes in incentives throughout the economy, at least 
over a two-to-three year time horizon.
To see annual changes in the RER, an index of the prices of 
tradables (F'ti) is needed, divided in each year by an index of 
the opportunity costs of nontradables (F'nti), to make an index of 
the real exchange rate <REF:i). In no country would we expect 
such an RERi to stay constant over time. It would inevitably be 
influenced by changing incomes, technology, the relative amounts 
of domestic resources such as labour, land, and capital, as well 
as changes in the other influences on the balance of payments 
such as the terms of trade, capital flows, trade policies, and so 
forth.
All of these changes will affect the opportunity cost of foreign 
exchange, but most of them can be expected to move only slowly. 
Much more rapid changes, of a much larger magnitude, will occur 
due to changing inflation in the domestic economy, relative to 
the nominal exchange rate. Because the prices of tradables are 
determined abroad, they will be less affected by domestic 
inflation, which will tend to push up the prices of nontradables 
more, thus lowering RERi. To find an absolute level for the 
desired real exchange rate, some year (or average of years) in 
which the relative price of tradables to nontradables was 
desirable can be targeted, and policies to restore that level of 
RERi can be implemented.1^
Using a historical reference, the RER method shows what exchange 
rate would be necessary to reach the historical target relative *
155 . Alternatively, an econometric model of the RER could be built, to find the influence on the RERi of variables such as 
domestic income, the terms of trade, official borrowing, and the 
money supply. This approach is discussed in the methodological 
appendix; here, only the historical approach will be used.
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price between tradables and nontradables. At those targeted relative costs and., returns to the production of exports and 
import—substitutes, the economy would be drawn towards the trade 
balance which prevailed during the target period. In the context o-f Zimbabwe, the balance o-f trade itself is expected to remain 
around zero, with exports roughly egual to imports. What is 
desired is a simultaneous increase in both exports and imports, 
reducing the need for import controls and allowing broader access 
to imported equipment and production inputs.
3. Empirical estimates -for Zimbabwe
In this section, the data available in Zimbabwe are reviewed, and 
the results discussed. The discussion begins with general 
macroeconomic conditions, then considers the various price 
indeces which can be used for the RER approach, and concludes by 
reviewing the resulting RER ratios. All growth rates, averages, 
and graphs presented here are calculated from the data tables 
given at the end of the paper.
3.1 Macroeconomic conditions
Table 1 presents basic macroeconomic data for the late UDI period 
(1975-80) and the recent post-Independence period (1980-88).
TABLE 1.
Average
Annual
Changes:
SELECTED MACROECONOMIC
Official Money 
Exch.Rate Supply 
(SDR/Z$> (M2)
INDICATORS,
Nominal
GDP
1975-80 and 1980-88
Government
Deficit*
1975-80 -3, 47.** 15, 17 10,87. 4 1 , o>;
1980-88 -14,97. 12,57. 16, 17. 14,67.
Interest Low- Gvt.Def.
Average on Gvt. income GDP as 7.
Levels: Bonds CPI Deflator of GDP*
1975-80 7,97. 10, 37. 10, 77. 8,87;
1980-88 12,77. 14,37. 8,87. 6,57.
* Data are for 1976-80 and 1980-87 only.
** Not statistically significantly different from zero. 
Source: Calculated from Table 2.
These data show that, in the late 1970s, the nominal exchange 
rate was roughly constant, the money supply expanded much faster 
than nominal GDP, and interest rates stayed well below inflation 
making real interest rates negative. This is a classic 
disequilibrium situation, influenced largely by explosive growth 
in the government deficit, which reached almost 117. of GDP in 
1978, 1979, and 1980. Such a situation, common to many African
countries at this time, leads inevitably to falling real incomes.
After Independence, the government deficit as a share of GDP was 
brought down, the dollar was devalued to catch up with past 
inflation, and real interest rates rose. Most importantly, 
growth in the money supply was reduced to less than the growth in 
nominal GDP, thus stopping the trend towards ever-higher 
inflation. Although the rate of inflation was not reduced, 
continued nominal devaluation kept pace with it, and real GDP 
growth was achieved. In many ways, Zimbabwe undertook an 
orthodox reform of the inherited disequilibrium situation, 
avoiding the worst of the structural adjustment crises which 
plagued many other African countries at this time.
Undoubtedly the most dramatic.of the post-Independence 
macroeconomic changes is shown, in Figure 1. Economy-wide average 
real wages, which had grown steadily at about 27. per year since 
the 1950s, were stalled in the late 1970s.1* At Independence, 
new labour laws suddenly pushed economy-^wide average real wages 
up 187. over the first three years of Independence. 17 These 
increases were appreciably above the long-term trend, and above 
any increases in productivity, so firms simply stopped hiring new 
workers. The total number of formal-sector employees rose by 
less than 17. in 1982, and then fell by over 17. in 1983. 18
Soon, inflationary pressures from production bottlenecks, 
continued government deficits, and the wage increases themselves
• 12
14: . Agricultural wages did not follow the economy-wide 
picture. They rose in the 1950s, fell badly from 1963 to 1972, 
then picked up in the mid- to late-1970s -- but at Independence 
were still about even with their pre-UDI peak. The failure of 
agricultural wages to keep pace with increases in overall wages 
in the 1960s and early 1970s could be due to several factors. 
Firstly, the large-scale commercial (LSC) farm sector was the 
hardest hit by the inward-looking policies of UDI. Secondly, LSC 
farm workers were quite isolated from the rest of the labour 
market, with little mobility. Many commercial farmworkers have 
no other possible home in Zimbabwe, and their children may well 
continue to work on the same farm. And thirdly, although precise 
data are not available, there was probably continued in-migration 
throughout the 1960s of unskilled farmworkers from Malawi and 
elsewhere. This would have kept farm wages low, while rising 
productivity in urban jobs lifted industrial and other wages for 
more educated Zimbabweans.
17. Agricultural average real wages were boosted by an even more amaizing 607..
ta. See CS0, Quarterly Digest 
Table 7.1 for details. of Statistics iMarch 1989)
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worked their way through the price control system (which can only 
delay inflation, not stop it), and reduced the economy-wide 
average real wage back below its 1980 level. This was well below 
its long-run trend level, and in 1985, after this fall in real wages, total employment grew by 2,57. to surpass for the first 
time its previous 1975 peak. Although more recent data on wages 
are not available, aggregate demand for labour does not seem to 
have increased faster than the labour force, so real wages are 
unlikely to have recovered back to the long-term trend.
FIGURE 1. REAL NATIONAL AVERAGE WAGES. 1954-64
DEFLATED BY ALTERNATIVE INDECES
}.%o•JO£n
Tfin
□  High-incoie CPI (food onlyi 0 Low-incoie CPI (food only)
+  High-incoae CPi (whole index) A  Lou-mcoae CPI (whole index)
3.2 Price indeces
The effects of these macroeconomic trends on exchange rates can 
be seen through the changes in various price indeces, shown in 
Figure 2 and Table 3. These indeces may focus on the prices of 
tradables, all goods together, or nontradables.
To show the prices of tradables (converted at the official 
exchange rate), a trade unit value (TUV) index can be used, 
defined as the simple average of export unit values and import 
unit values. These are published by the CSO beginning with 1964. 
Both unit values are calculated on a point-of-despatch basis. 
Thus, they include correct transport costs for exports, but not 
for imports: this index should rise more when transport costs
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rise, and -fall more when they fall. The TUV index also does not 
include changes in trade policy which would increase or decrease 
the markup between border and domestic pricess it should rise 
more when more export incentives are paid, or more import duties 
are charged. These did not changed very much during this period, 
however. itf . -
To show domestic prices of all goods, both tradables and 
nontradables, consumer price indecss (CPI, for either low- or 
high-income consumers), or the GDP deflator can be used. The 
CPIs consist of a basket of goodsidesigned to reflect an "average” urban family s annual budget, with weights that are 
revised every few years as discussed in the notes to Table 3.
The GDP deflator, in contrast, includes the prices of all goods 
and services in the economy, weighted by their importance every 
year. Both types of indeces are shown on Table 3. The two CPIs 
and .their food-price components tend to move very much together, 
although food in the low-income CPI has moved up the fastest in 
recent years, while the whole high-income CPI has risen the 
least.
To show the domestic prices of nontradables, we would like goods 
which have few nontradable inputs or substitutes, and are 
relatively unaffected bv price controls. It would be ideal, for 
example, to use wholesale prices for fresh vegetables, rental 
rates for rooms and houses, and the wages of temporary workers 
not subject to minimum wages. However, no consistent long-term 
series of such prices are available. The most appropriate data 
are probably the prices for certain building materials, 
particularly bricks, building aggregates, and timber and wood. 
Small quantities of all of these are traded with neighbouring 
countries, and cement is covered by usually-enforced price 
controls, but in general these three items can be expected to 
give a good picture of nontradables prices.
This three-good nontradable index is calculated in Table 3 and 
shown in Figure 2, where it is seen to stay very close to the 
whole building materials price index (BMPI). This is in part 
because the three' "nontradab le" items account for over 50"/. of the 
whole BMPI (which is designed to monitor the price of materials 
for a standard three-bedroomed home), but,also because these 
goods are complements to one another in the same sector, so their 
prices can be expected to move together.; Thus, whether the 
three-good nontradables average price index or the whole E-iMF'I is 
used is of little importance.
What did change was the scarcity value or quota rent -on import licenses. , But because, the quantity of imports under 
scarce import licenses.is fixed, changes in their domestic prices 
do not serve as an incentive to import more or.less, so should 
not be included in our TUV index. ■
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figure 2. ALTERNATIVE PRICE INDECES. 1954-86
Low CPI +• 6DP Clef I. O NT Avg. a. BMPI X T u V
Here, the low-income CPI can be seen as'rising at an intermediate 
rate, between the slowest-rising indeces, the GDP deflator and 
the trade unit value; and the fastest-rising ones, the BMPI and 
the nontradable average. Clearly, the slowest-rising indeces are 
either dominated by trade (the TUV) or by government (in 1988, 
total government spending of around *4,6 -billion accounted for 
over half of SDP, heavily influencing the 6DP deflator).
It might be argued that the faster rise in building materials 
prices, both the whole BMPI and its major nontradable components, 
is due to some particular feature of the construction industry 
not shared by other nontradables. While there are some recent 
trends which have a particular impact on the construction
5UCh SS high rural~urt>an migration, most influences on the B.1P1 are shared by other nontradables. These include overall 
consumer demand, the costs of labour, and rents for land and housing.
Evidence that the construction-ma 
shared by other nontradables can 
the GDP deflator into industries
teriais price rises have been 
be gleaned from breaking down 
of origin. This is simply
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nominal GDP over real GDP in each sector, the results of which 
are shown in Table 5. The industries with the -fastest price 
rises all produce mostly nontradables: electricity and water (a
public-sector activity with limited trade), construction (a 
mostly private-sector nontradable), domestic services (a private- 
sector nontradable much influenced by minimum wage laws), 
distribution and -financial services (both private-sector 
nontradables).
The industries with the slowest price rises are public 
administration (largely government salaries) , and mining (most o-f 
whose output is exported). Real estate is also a slow-riser, 
perhaps due to rent controls in urban areas —  since GDP figures 
consist almost entirely of official1 y-reported data, the rising 
value of lodgers rooms or rural and peri-urban housing would not 
affect the GDP deflator. Education and health are the next 
slowest-risers, both of which are largely in the public sector. 
The transport and communications sector largely follows petrol 
prices, having kept up high price levels until the recent decline 
in oil costs.
The two largest sectors, manufacturing (27V. of GDP in 1988) and 
agriculture (15V. of GDP) had intermediate price rises, with 
manufacturing somewhat above agriculture. The manufacturing 
sector produces mostly import-substitutes, products that are 
protected.by import quotas through, the import license allocation 
system. Thus their domestic prices tend to move with domestic 
inflation —  subject to the effects of price controls —  since 
the will be no additional imports to absorb increases in demand. 
In contrast, agriculture produces mostly products which are 
exported at the official exchange rate. They receive no quota 
protection, and domestic prices reflect only changes in the 
exchange rate or foreign prices.
3.3 Real exchange rate indeces
To measure changes in relative prices, the price indeces 
discussed above can be combined into various real exchange rate 
ratios. These are calculated in Table 4. Since the ratios all 
reflect types of exchange rates, changes will be discussed in 
terms of the value of foreign currency: a rising index implies a
rising value of forex (a depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar), 
while a falling ratio implies a falling value of forex (an 
appreciation of the dollar).
In addition to RER indeces, some purchasing-power parity (PF'P) 
indeces have been included for comparison. These measure changes 
in overall price levels in Zimbabwe relative to border prices, as 
discussed, in the appendix. The PPP ratios in Figure 3 show 
slight decreases in the value of traded goods relative to local 
ones in the first three years of UDI, followed by stability until 
1973. Then, the value of traded goods rocketed upwards in 1974, 
and again in 1978-80. These rises are associated primarily with
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the world oil price rises o+' 1973-74 and 1978-79, which were quickly transmitted to the prices of many other goods on 
international markets. After Independence, all the PPP indeces 
fell for three years, then rose after the nominal exchange rate devaluations of 1982 and 1983 (shown in Table 2). From 1985, 
however, they fell again.
FIGURE 3. PURCHASING POWER PARITY INDECES 1964-87
O  Iijv . (..PIIHigh) + rilV/OPKLow) \) lUV/bDP Defl.
Of the PPP indeces, the two CPI-based ratios generally move 
together. The only divergence between them began in 1984, when 
the low-income CPI moved up relative to the high-income CPI.
The GDP deflator-based ratio, however, moved in the opposite 
direction in 1973 and 1987, and as the GDP deflator showed much 
slower increases in the mid-1980s, the corresponding PPP index 
rises much higher at that time. The major reason for this is 
probably the much slower price increases in government than in 
the private sector, which have kept the GDP deflator below the CPIs.
The PER indeces are shown on Figure 4. Here, the oil price 
shocks give the same upward jumps in 1974 and 1978-79, but the 
general trend has been downwards since UDI, keeping a rough 
constancy around an index level just below 1,0. After 1980,
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however, the RER indeces fell by about 30V. in the first three 
years. This decline was temporarily reversed by the accelerated 
depreciation of 1982-83, but a further 15V. fall after 1984 
brought the RER indeces to a third below their average pre- 
Independence level.
figure 4. REAL EXCHANGE RATE HDECES. 1964-1987
a  rUV/BMPI + TUV/NT Ave.
The post-Independence fall of about one-third in the value of 
forex represents the combined effect of many forces, including 
the continued budget deficits, and capital inflows, the minimum 
wage laws discussed earlier, the price-raising effect of 
shortages and bottlenecks in the tradables sector, and a general 
burst of catch-up growth following the end of the war. But 
whatever its causes, this fall in the. RER has twisted incentives 
away from the production of tradables and towards nontradables.
In.practical terms, it has become more profitable to invest in 
dry-cleaning or take-aways than in factories and farms; more 
desirable to be a builder or a mechanic than a leathei— worker or 
tailor producing for export. This has reduced the availability 
of exports and increased the demand for imports, as compared with 
what it would otherwise have been.
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The effects of this change in relative prices is not exactly the 
same for exports and imports. As mentioned above, the foreign 
exchange allocation system serves as a quota on essentially all 
imports except petrol. This creates shortages, which allow the uncontrolled prices of import-substitutes to rise freely with 
domestic inflationary pressures, like nontradables. In some 
cases, the controlled price may be raised to help alleviate these 
shortages. Or, a black market may arise. Sometimes, both will 
happen. In the case of rice, for example, there is both a 
controlled price that is above the border price, and a 
substantial parallel market at an even-higher price.
These higher domestic prices, or quota rents, on importable goods 
have helped their producers to escape the exchange rate tax 
against tradables. But since the quantity of the good actually 
imported remains fixed by the import licenses, the high prices 
obtained by the producers of importables do not reduce the demand 
for forex. In addition, importables are often highly import­
intensive, since they include manufactures, chemicals, and other 
industrial goods. To the extent that the producers of these 
goods have succeeded in obtaining import licenses for their 
inputs, this has also helped them to offset the exchange rate 
tax.
Producers of exportables, in contrast, have no such escapes.
Their product prices are fixed by foreign prices divided by the 
official exchange rate, while the prices of their nontradable 
input prices and non-price-control led importable inputs are 
raised by the exchange rate tax. Those exporters who receive 
considerable import licenses, through regular channels or through 
the special Export Revolving Fund (ERF), or who receive 
compensation in Zimbabwe dollars through the Export Incentive 
Scheme (EIS), have all been penalized less than other exporters. 
But these privileged exporters are hardly ever the small, 
dispersed "emergent" producers of such low-input, labour 
intensive exports as communal-area cotton or light manufactures. 
Such activities are highly economically efficient, although they 
are perhaps not very technically sophisticated or prestigious, 
and they contribute strongly towards improved income distribution and employment. Penalizing them is therefore extremely costly, 
in terms of both equity and overall economic growth. 4
4. Implications for policy
To compensate the producers of tradables for recent changes in 
the real exchange rate, a value of forex about 50*/. above its 1987 
levels would be’ needed. And although consistent data before 1964 
are not available, one might go even further back to target the 
pre-UDI 1964-65 level, a further 5-107. above the UBI average.
This suggests that, in 1987, the forex premium should have been 
at least 507.. In 1988 and early 1989, there has been continued 
nominal depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar. But there was also
an increase in the money supply in 1988, and continued shortages 
of important production inputs and consumer goods. Thus the RER 
index has probably not improved, and the -forex premium remains at 
least at its 1987 level.
A target -forex premium o-f 50% is somewhat below the 100% premium 
recommended by the Ministry o-f Finance, Economic Planning and 
Development, and slightly above the 407. suggested by the World 
Bank. It is not exceptionally large by the standards o-f other 
countries with similar -foreign-exchange control systems, but it 
is su-f-ficient to a-f-fect decision-making and incomes throughout 
the economy. In the agricultural sector alone, it represents a 
tax against -farmers on the order o-f half a billion dollars, about 
407. ot agricultural GDP. This very much reduces farmer incomes 
and their ability to invest in productivity-enhancing 
improvements, and is a strong disincentive against production for 
export.
To compensate for this tax, the first step is to apply the forex 
premium to official project appraisals and government planning 
efforts. This is certainly important, since it allows government 
decision-making to reflect national, rather than purely private, 
costs and benefits. But such appraisals govern only a minority 
of all investment and economic management decisions. In order to 
induce the whole private sector to participate in expanding the 
availability of forex, this higher value of forex would have to 
be spread throughout the entire economy.
Foreign-currency incentive programmes such as the ERF can help to 
offset the exchange rate tax, but they only assist exporters in 
proportion to their use of importable inputs. Local-currency 
incentive programmes such as the EIS could reach everyone, but it 
is difficult tor small and/or remote producers to apply for the 
subsidy payments, and producers of most exports sold through the 
marketing boards are not eligible. Thus, the compensation 
mechanisms are limited in their scope: a few exporters get very 
large.subsidies, while many get nothing at all. In particular, 
special programmes cannot reach the small, low-input, labour- 
intensive potential exporter who is most penalised by the current 
system.
To spread the benefits of export production most widely, the 
easiest policy is one of accelerated increases in the exchange 
rate, to raise the value of exportables and importables 
throughout the economy. Then, this higher Zimbabwe dollar value 
of exports and cost of imports could be passed on to producers 
and consumers, through the price control system. Progressive 
depreciation of the currency under the current crawling peg 
system has been an established element ot government policy ever 
since 1981. The problem of exchange rate policy is really one of 
the rate of depreciation.
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The analysis presented here suggests that merely keeping pace 
with differential inflation is not enough. The accelerated 
depreciation of 1982-1984 was subsequently slowed down, but the 
results presented in this paper suggest it should have continued, 
since the real exchange rate improvement it achieved in 1984 was 
relatively small and short-lived. To obtain stronger and longer- 
lasting improvements; and escape -from the current ■forex- 
shortage/ low-employment trap, a return to accelerated 
depreciation would be needed. Ultimately, a 50/i catch-up in real 
relative prices would be desirable. However, this does not mean 
that a 50/i nominal devaluation is called for.
Many analysts throughout the world have found strong links 
between devaluation and inflation, particularly in the short run. 
This occurs largely because most goods are tradable, and their 
prices are raised directly by a devaluation. But it occurs also 
because price rises in one sector are partly transmitted to other 
sectors, so nontradables' prices will rise as well.
The degree to which a nominal devaluation yields a real exchange 
rate improvement depends very much on the inflationary pressures 
which created the real exchange rate decline in the first place. 
The stronger these pressures, the less improvement in the RER 
will be felt. But in the Zimbabwean context, several of the 
immediate post-war pressures have receded. In particular, 
capital inflows have slowed, and real wages are back to or below 
their long-term trend. To the extent that the remaining 
inflationary pressures —  particularly the government budget 
deficit and production bottlenecks —  are also reduced, nominal 
depreciation can be expected to yield significant real exchange 
rate improvements. In addition, low growth in the money supply 
would1 have to be maintained, to prevent the once-only price rise 
caused by devaluation from becoming continuous inflation.
Reducing inflationary pressures is already a major objective of 
the government. These efforts could themselves be assisted by 
accelerated depreciation. Firstly, depreciation could be used to 
help reduce the budget deficit, by increasing the Zimbabwe dollar 
revenue of the public sector through higher earnings in the 
exporting parastatals. Secondly, depreciation could help ease 
production bottlenecks, if it were accompanied by channeling 
foreign exchange into productive equipment, spares, and inputs. 
But because- of the currently high levels of the government 
deficit and severe bottlenecks in production, devaluation in 
Zimbabwe is probably best undertaken slowly, in time with 
improvements elsewhere in the economy.
Arguments about exchange rate policy often focus on its 
efficiency aspect, in terms of overall growth in.national income. 
But in many countries, exchange rate policy is at least as 
important tor employment and income distribution. In Zimbabwe, 
most people and most poor people —  are farmers. Farms are by
nature net producers-o-f tradabless they turn nontradable land 
and labour into highly tradable crops and, livestock. And in 
Zimbabwe, these are mostly exportables, or substitutes -for 
exportables. Thus the -farm sector as a whole, but particularly 
communal-area farmers producing cotton, maize and oilseeds with 
few imported inputs, would benefit -from real depreciation —  to 
the extent that the higher revenue for their products was passed 
on to them.
The costs of a real depreciation would be borne by those who are 
net consumers of foreign exchange, mostly in urban areas. . This 
includes significant numbers of unemployed or underemployed poor, 
but the impact on them would be limited by the fact that their 
budgets are dominated by housing and low-valued foods, with 
relatively little tradable goods. Also, in Zimbabwe most urban 
people retain close ties with their rural homes, so that many of 
the urban poor would be able to share in the benefits of 
increased farm incomes. Those communal area residents who are 
net consumers of farm products (getting the extra money from off- 
farm earnings, including work on neighbours farms or remittances 
from relatives) would not be very much affected, because the 
goods they too mostly consume nontradables, or tradables which 
are not much protected by price controls.
The greatest losses would be felt by those at relatively high 
income levels, particularly in government and in industries which 
are unable to produce for tradables. But these losses would 
occur only in the short run; over time, as higher export 
earnings allow faster growth in the economy as a whole, all 
sectors would benefit.
In terms of the real wage, early gains from the high minimum wage 
introduced at Independence have already been reversed, and reel 
wages are unlikely to rise significant1 y again until employment 
and productivity can rise. Total employment 19 still dominated 
by the farm sector with over two-thirds of workers, so returns 
there will inevitably dominate average real wages especially 
among the poorest. In the minority: of non-farm .jobs, growth is 
likely to be concentrated in the exportables sector, if only 
because the other sectors have already enjoyed a decade-long 
boom. Further real growth in the nontradables and import- 
substitution sectors now requires complementary growth in the 
tradables sector, both to relax production bottlenecks caused by 
forex shortages, and to increase demand through growth in overall 
real incomes. 1 - ‘
In summary, a policy of accelerated depreciation would serve 
equity objectives as much as efficiency ones. The current system 
of extremely scarce import licenses benefits only the few people 
who actually get these goods; the relatively low price,of 
imported tractors, for example, is of little help to communal 
farmers -- while their extreme scarcity makes their low price'of
little use to most commercial -farmers. Income transfers such as 
subsidized tractors -for a few might have been an objective of the 
UD1 regime which created the current system, but they are no 
longer necessary elements of the Zimbabwean economy. A higher 
value of forex would help to reduce the shortage of foreign 
exchange and clear out production bottlenecks, raising incomes 
and employment prospects throughout the economy. But most 
importantly, it would remove the exchange rate tax from producers 
of tradables —  a tax which has been particularly severe on 
farmers, especially the low-input, labour-intensive producers in 
communal areas.
5. Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the concept of the real exchange rate, 
and presented the results of its application to Zimbabwe. These 
are shown to have powerful implications for the impact of 
government policy on growth and equity. Exchange rate policy has 
been shown to be a considerable drag on the farm sector, far 
outweighing (in dollar terms) all of the government's sectoral 
and commodity policies funded through the budget of the Ministry 
of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement and its associated 
parastatals (marketing boards, AFC and ARDA).
Analysis of the role of foreign exchange in the Zimbabwean 
economy, and in the agricultural sector in particular, should not 
stop here. Much more detailed examination of the real exchange 
rate is possible, through an analysis of its individual 
influences, and the construction of an econometric model to 
predict the separate effect of several macroeconomic variables. 
Alternatively, elasticity-based approaches could be implemented, 
to predict how exports and imports might respond to policy 
changes. Some possible methods are outlined in the appendix to 
this paper. In addition, the differential impact of the exchange 
rate tax within the agricultural sector could be analysed, to 
show how different crops and farming systems are affected. This 
is the topic of the larger project under which this paper was 
written.
Further analysis, however, is unlikely to change the main thrust 
of the basic results presented here. A significant exchange rate 
tax is currently being imposed in Zimbabwe, negatively affecting 
both the level and distribution of national income. But changing 
this is very difficult, as Zimbabwe s net users of foreign 
exchange —  including most urban industries —  benefit from the 
situation. To the extent that they are slow in switching into 
less import-dependent activities, they will undeniably lose in 
the short run from improvements in the real exchange rate. Thus 
trade policy reform poses a major challenge for government, with 
great obstacles as well as great potential rewards.
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TABLE 2. MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR ZIMBABWE, 1975-38 
(.ail data are lor year-end unless otherwise staU-Jj
GROSS
NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES MONEY SUPFLY INTEREST -RATES PUBLIC FINANCE (Z$ m . ) DOMESTIC INFLATION (1980=100)
SDR)Z$ USi/Zi (Zf million) GOVT. 12-Ho. . GOVT. NET BORROWING PRODUCT GDP - CPI
\endxavg. > tend) (avg.) (HI) (M2) BONDS C.ofD. DEFICIT DOMESTIC FOREIGN y l i m . ) Deflator (Low-Inc.)
12) (2) 12) (2i (li (li ■ (2)- (1) . (2) - <2i .(2) ( 2) (2,1) 11 j
1975 1,37 1.45 1,60 -1.76 324.1 440.6 6.55 5.3* 1,996 61.2 62.1
1976 1.39 1.36 1.62 1.60 351.9 518.0 6.5S 5.2*. 116.3 122.7 -0.9 2,166 67.0 68.9 ,
1977 1.27 1.36 11.55 1.59 374.5 . 552.1 J.6% 4.5* 95.4 96.0 -0.3 2,194 77.2 76.0
1976 l . U 1.18 ' 1.48 1.46 415.0 625.8 8.85 4.6% 253.5 129.5 . 124.0 2,360 61.6 83.4
1979 1.13 1.14 1.40 1.47 463.2 709.5 ,6.6% 4.9*. 293.4 172,0 121.4 2.825 94.9 94.9 -
1960 1.24 1.20 1.59 1.55 632.6 951.9 8.9* 5.2* 376.0 297.1 76.9 .3,443 100.0 100.0
1961 1.20 1.23 1.39 1.45 676.7 1034.8 11.55 14.6* 261.6 115.6 146.0 4,433 114.5 113.2
1962 0.99 1.20 1.0S 1.32 770,4 1236.0 13.0* 10.6% 545.3 413.5 131.6 5 . H 9 i29.8 125.2
1963 0.66 0.93 0.90 0.99 740.3 1267.9 13.1* 14.5% 393.7 244.4 43.5 . 5,-980 156.9 154.1
1964 0.66 - 0.-76 0.67 0.60 881; 9 1553.2 13.3* 9.8% - 647.4 324.9; 1 ,6.695 159.6 iS5.2
1665 0.55 0.61 • 0.6i 0.62- 972.4- 1618.7 13.3% 10.3%. 512.5 295.0 aS7.y 7.609 164.0 200.9
1966 0.49 0.51 0.60 0.60 1062.3 1638.4 13.2* - 10,6% 60 i . / 1 265.6 6.379 179.6 229.7
1967 ■ 0-.42 0.60 0.60 1204.7 2064.1 1-3.9% 10.0* I0i4.6 S47.3 167.4. 169.0 258.3
1966 0.-38 0.51 0.56 1572.5 2562.3 14.0* 10.6% £04.6 276.6
Annual Exchange Rate Money Supply Govt.- Nominal GDF CPi
Growth Rates: SDR)li ■USSrZi Hi ' M2 Deficit GDP Deflator. (Low-inc.)
(end of year >
1575-•60 -3.»% -1.0* 13.0S 15.15 41.0% LO. 6% - 10.7% 10.3%
i-stat.: 13 -1.10 6» 5 9.4 . 4.5 6.1 17.7 - 25.6
1950- 58 -U.35& -13.4 V 11. os 12.E-S 14.6% 16. i% 6.6* 14.3*
t-siat.: -23.5 -6.73■ 11.5 21.6 3.7 •19.9 11.1 . 25.3
Notes: All growth rates calculated By least-squares method.
Gvt. Deficit growth rate is calculated for 1978-60 and 1980-67 only.
GDF growth rate is calculated for-1930-66 oniv.
Rate for 12-month Certificates of Deposit is the highest prevailing rate.
For 1965. the 6-month Certificate or Deposit rate is given.
Government bond yield is the period-to-maturity rate or. 25-year bonds (known as "stock” in Zimbabwe.)
CF1 (Low income) is an annual average. Entry for- 1988 is through November oniy.
Government finance statistics change in 1965, when end of fiscal year moved from 31 December to 31 June. 
GDF Deflator calculated from (2j for 1975-60. and from t1f for 1961-86.
Sources: Uj CSu, Quarterly Digest of Statistics (March 1969 and March 1961, plus Supplement Aprii 1961» 
i.2.' IHF, international Financial-Statistics ■-Yearbook 1987-and Hay i969t.
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TABLE 3. WAGES AND PRICE 1NDECES FOR ZIMBABWE, 1954-1986
DOMESTIC PRICES BORDER PRICES
Average Earnings per Employee (Zl) Urban Consuaer Price Index Building Materials Trade Unit. .......... .........  -.. —....-.....  Price Index Value Index
Agric. A Forestry National Lou Income High Income GDP
Deflator
Ttmhar kl.T Uhole
index
imports Avg. 
ExportsBlack Other Nat11.Black Other Nat'l. Food Total Food Total Cement Avg.
1954 98 1666 119 130 1768 300 29.5 33.6 33.5 29.7 19.5 27.6 25.1
1955 102 1752 125 140 1850 323 29.8 34.1 27.0 29.3 21.4 25.9 26.3
1956 106 1992 132 150 1976 346 32.1 35.6 27.4 28.5 22.4 26.1 26.6
1957 110 1992 138 164 2112 384 33.5 36.7 29.3 28.2 22.2 26.8 26.7
1958 116 1950 144 176 2182 415 34.9 36.0 34.1 27.1 20.9 27.4 26.61959 118 2250 154 182 2206 430 36.3 39.0 31.6' 27.7 21.2 26.8 26.4
1960 120 2312 158 188 2268 443 37.1 40.0 33.4 28.0 20.8 27.4 26.71961 122 2300 160 204 2308 463 38.5 41.1 29.9 27.9 20.4 26.1 25.9
1962 ill 2294 162 212 2372 489 41.0 40.5 39.3 42.0 31.7 31. i 20.3 27.7 26.51963 122 2500 175 227 2437 513 41.4 40.8 39.4 42.4 33.3 31.3 20.7 28.4 27.0 -
1964 123 2620 174 238 2492 509 42.3 42,9 40.0 43.6 34.3 31.5 21.7 29.2 27.6 24.6 35.6 30.1
1965 123 2729 177 249 2577 536 43.7 43.9 41.0 44.3 34.3 32.7 22.4 29.8 28.3 25.5 37.1 31.3
1966 125 2540 175 259 2666 560 45.5 45.3 42.4 45.5 34.6 33.0 £3.1 30.3 29.4 28.1 33.7 30,91967 123 2592 177 269 2715 575 46.3 45.9 43.1 46.4 35.0 33.4 24.0 30.8 30.2 28.0' 32.6 30.3
1968 123 2562 173 278 2823 595 46.2 47.0 44.1 47.4 36.0 34.4 25.4 32.0 31.1 27.6 33.3 30.41969 123 2643 171 287 2973 616 48.2 47.2 44.6 48.7 38.8 35.7 26.9 33.8 32.2 28.1 35.4 31.7
1970 127 2658 179 305 3114 654 49.1 48.2 46.0 50.4 42.5 39.9 36.4 £8.0 34.8 33.6 29.4 36. i 32.71971 131 2740 181 324 3357 700 50.3 49.6 47.2 51.9 43.7 41.6 37.1 29.6 36.1 34.7 31.3 36.5 33.9
1972 133 2863 183 337 3628 733 51.7 51.1 49.5 54.2 45.4 44.1 37.8 31.6 37.9 35.8 30.6 37.3 34,01973 142 3160 198 359 3901 783 53.9 52.6 51.2 56.1 53.8 44.3 40.1 34.6 39.6 38.3 31.9 40.6 36.2
1974 159 3883 220 402 4525 869 57.6 56.1 56.7 60.4 54.9 45.7 44.4 43,3 44.5 44.6 43.5 54.8 49.1
.1975 180 4817 256 464 5093 995 64.8 61.7 61.4 65.0 61.2 40.9 53.1 49.8 50.6 51.0 48.0 58.2 53.1
1976 209 5000 290 524 5618 1113 70.5' 66.6 66.9 70.9 67.0 52. S 58.3 52.6 54.6 56.6 54.4 53.4 56.91977 232 5450 322 588 6156 1228 ' 78.6 77.1 73.5 77.7 77.2 67.2 67.5 61.0 65.2 65.9 55.0 62.8 50.9
1978 352 1352 86,5 84.6 82.1 82.6 81.6 74.2 76.8 66.6 73.2 68,8 67.1 68.0
■1979 411 1525 97.0 95.8 91.3 91.8 94.9 86.7 90.9 81.5 86.4 84.8 93.6 77.4 85.5
1980 458 1862 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,01981 2213 112.0 113.1 113.4 114.6 114.5 136.6 123.2 130.5 130.1 125.5 99.5 110.6 105.11982 919 2789 . 123.8 125.2 126.3 135.7 129.8 159.2 147.1 141.9 149.4 142.2 99,1■107.3103,21983 * 1061 3068 159.1 154.1 152.1 158.0 156.9 188.9 169.3 160.5 172.9 166.2 116.4 121.3118.91984 1177 3359 198.8 165.2 183.8 177.7 159.6 209.1 185.2 177.9 190.7 190.5 131.2 158.3144.8.1985 212.3 200.9 200.6 195.3 164.0 259.0 197.5220.0 225.5£36.1 152.7 188.5 170.61986 ' 240.1 229.7 225.1 Ofl4.*.^ t O 179.6 300.9£28.3258.3262.5£60.8 159.7 192.0 175.91967 276.0 258.3 261.0 246.4 189.0 325.4247.7288.3287.1 292.4 183.0 194.0 188.51988 299.2 276.6 234.6 263.6 204.8 347.8278.3 305.1 309.7309.9
Notes: Ail Indeces have been linked to 1380=100.
Building material price index series changes in 1965, to include building aggregates along with cement, and 
to include delivery charges to site in Bricks and Cement.
Ave. earnings per'employee series changes in 1574 and again in 1978 when racial classification is abandoned. 
Low-income CPI weights were revised in 1962, 1965, 1970, 1973, and 1981.
High-income CPI weights were revised in 1962, 1969, 1973, 1976, and 1978.
All CPI data for 1988 are U-month averages through November only.
GDP deflator is from IMF, international Financial Statistics for 1970-60, and calculated from 
CS0, Quarterly Digest of Statitics for 1981-88.
Sources: CSu, Monthly Digest of Statistics (Jan. 1969, Hat. 1981) and Supplement (Apr. 1981).CS0, Quarterly Digest of Statistics (Mar. 1989).
IMF, International Financial Statistics 11987).
REAL WAGE RATES REAL EXCHANGE PURCHASING POU
(Constant 1980 dollars) RATE INDECES PARITY INDECE
. Agricultural Wages/ Nat’l. Average Wages/ -------- - ...... ......................  TUV/ TUV/ - TUV/ TUV/
CPi(high) CPI(low) CPI thigh) CPI(low) BHPI NT Avg. CPl-hi CPI-lo
Black Nat'1,Black Nat’I. Food Total Food Total
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TABLE 4. REAL WAGE RATES AND RELATIVE-PRICE EXCHANGE RATE INDECES FOR ZIMBABWE, 1954-1988
1954 292 • 356 . 1016 893
1955 299 365 1082 946
1956 298 372 1078 971
1957 300 377 1147 1047
1958 306 378 1188 1093
1959 302 395 1186 1103
1960 300 396 1194 1107
1961 297 389 1203 1126
1962 264 386 271 401 1245 1164 1192 1208
1963 . 288 . 412 295 428 1302 1203 1239 1255
1964 282 399 291 406 1274 1168 1203 1186 109.1 103 .3 6 9 .1 7 1 .2
1965 277 400 281 404 1307 1203 1225 1219 110 .4 105 . 0, ' 7 0 .6 7 1 .6
1966 275 ■385 275 387 1320 1232 1232 1236 105 .2 102 .1 6 7 .9 6 8 .0
1967 265 381 ■ 266 384 1335 1240 1242 1252 100 .4 9 8 .4  . 6 5 .3 ’  6 5 .4
1963 260 366 255 368 1348 1258 1235 1266 9 7 .8 9 5 .2 6 4 .2 6 3 .1
1969 253 352 255 363 1381 1264 1278 1304 9 8 .5 9 4 .0 6 5 .2 6 5 .9
1970 252 355 258 371 1422 1298 1 J 3.i 1356 9 7 .2 9 4 .1  . 6 4 .9 6 6 .6
1971 252 348 261 364 1463 1348 1392 1410 - 9 7 .8 9 4 .0 6 5 .3 6 7 .5
1972 . 245 3 3 6 ' 257 359 1481 1354 1419 1437 9 4 .7 8 9 .7 6 2 .7 6 5 .7
1973 253 352 264 376 1529 1395 1453 1488 9 4 .5 9 1 .0 6 4 .5 6 7 .3
197a 263 364 276 392 1533 1439 1508 1549 110 .2 110 .6 8 1 .4 8 5 .3
1975 277 394 278 415 1620 1530 . 1535 1612 104 .2 105 .0 6 1 .7 8 1 .9
1976 295 409 296 421 1663 1570 1577 1616 100 .6 1 0 4 .2 6 0 .3 8 0 .7
1977 299 415 295 - 418 1671 1581 1563 1594 8 9 .4 9 0 .3 7 5 .8 7 4 .9
1973 ■ 425 ■416 1647 1632 1564 1598 9 3 .3 9 2 .8 8 2 .1 7 8 .6
1979 448 429 1670 1661 1573 1592 100 .8 9 9 .0 9 3 .1 SS .2
1980 458 456 1862 1862 1862 1862 100 .0 100 .0 1 0 0 .0 . 100 .0
1981 ' 650 656 1952 1931 1976 1957 8 3 .7 8 0 .7 9 1 .7 9 3 .8
1982 677 734 2208 2055 2253 2227 7 2 .6 6 9 .1 7 6 .1 8 3 .4
1983 671 688 2 0 1 7 . 1942 1928 1991 " 1 .5 6 8 .7 7 5 .2 7 4 .7
1984  ' 662 . 635 1828 1890 1690 1814 7 6 .0 7 5 .9 8 1 .5 7 2 .8
1985 7 2 .3 7 5 .7 8 7 .4 8 0 .4
1986 6 7 .4 6 7 .0 7 8 .9 7 3 .2
1987 6 4 .5 6 5 .6 7 6 .5 6 8 .3
1988
Source: Calculated from Table 3.
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TABLE 5. GBP DEFLATORS AND PBQpneTIONS OF GDP BY SECTOR, 1977-1988
GDP DEFLATORS 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1986(1980 = 100) 
Electricity k water 96.6 88.6 110.9 100.0 111.4 115.9 286.8 202.9 182.3 258.5 260.2 261.5
Construction -■ 77.1 73.6 103.4 100.0 131.4 188.1 277.4 238.4 240.6 244.9 209.4 224.0
Domestic services 72.2 75.4 81.5 100.0 114.3 139.3 146.7 147.5 160.0 215.0 221.5 260.0
D1strib., hotels a restaurants 71.8 108.2 125.4 100.0 132.2 164.3 199.7 202.7 201,3 138.6 213.0 233.5
Finance insurance 53.1 61.4 79.4 100.0 106.3 109.6 135.5 149.2 183.4 202.2 209.7 231.7
Manufacturing 70.4 81.9 89.7 100.0 115.3 127.8 169.1 182.3 165.0 185.0 206.7 221.2
Agriculture k forestry 82.9 65.1 72.3 100.0. 124.3 140.0 135.0 150.8 163.7 194.6 201.5 207.4
Transport L communications 100.6 106.6 108.7 100.0 138.5 161.5 179.9 192.0 iei.9 21i.l 167.2 177.7
Education 55.5 67.7 77.2 100.0 91.1 108.8 110.6 124.2 145.3 162.7 167.4 197.7
Health 72.1 79.4 88.2 100.0 107.9 120.5 121.3 124.7 147.4 164.0 170.4 186.3
Other services n.e.s. 69.3 73.6 82.4 100.0 117.7 135.8 147.4 159.4 178.3 147.0 158.3 166.1
Real estate 71.2 83.3 91.7 100.0 127.9 127.9 134.1 136.4 154.5 146.7 160.0 168.9
Mining L quarrying 48.2 53.4 77.4 100.0 90.6 76.4 140.4 110.0 127.8 127.0 144.7 181.8
Public administration 83.3 86.3 97.5 100.0 91.2 110.2 117.6 122.0 128.0 139.5 150.3 155.2
Less imputed banking charges 71.4 79.3 91.1 100.0, 114.2 129.2 157.3 160.0 164.0 176.5 187.5 203.3
TOTAL GDF 71.7 78.7 .,91.0 ’100.0 114.5 129.8 156.9 159.6 164.0 179.6 168.4 204.8
PROPORTION OF GDP 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1964 1985 1986 1987 1988
AT CURRENT PRICES 
Manufacturing 22.8% 23.6% 24.9% 25.-1% 24.1% 26.5% 26.1% 23.9% 24.8% 27.0% 26.5%
Agriculture a forestry 16.1% 12.8% 12.1% 14.0% 15.8% 14.4% 10.0% 13.2% 16.1% 16.1% 13.1% 14.5%
Distrib., hotels k restaurants 11.7* 15.8% ,16.0% 14.0% 14.9% 15.9% 14.4% 13.1% 12.5% 11.9% 12.4% 12.4%
Education ' 3.7% 3.8% 3.7% 5.2% 5.3% 6.6% 6.3% 7.4% 8.4% 6.8% 8.9% 9.1%
Public administration 9.3% 10.6% 10.2% 9.0% 7.6% 7.9% 7.3% 7.9% 7.6% 7.4% 6.0% 7.4%
Transport U communications 8.0% 7.9% 7.1% 6.5% 7.6% 7.0% 7.4% 7.7% 6.9% 7,4% 5.4% 6.1%
Mining & quarrying 7.2% 6.9% 8.5% 8.8% 6.2% 4.7% 7.2% 5.7% 5.9% 5.3% 6.0% 6.4%Other services n.e.s. - 5.5% 5.3% 5.1% 5.4% 5.4% 5.9% 5.8% 6.1% 6.7% CJ. i-n 5.2% 5.1%Finance k insurance 4.9% 4.7% 4.6% 4.9% 4.8% 4.9% 5.1% 5.0% 5.5% 5.3% 5.6% 5.6%Electricity k water 2.7 % 4. i'% 2.7% 2.2% 1.9% 1.6% 3.6% 2.5% 2.3% 3.5% 4.4% 4.5%Construction 4.1% 3.0% 3.5% 2.8% 3.4% 4.1% 4.7% 3.6% 2.5% 2.4% 2.4% 2.0%Health 2.4% 2.4% 2.3% 2.2% 2.0% 2.3% 2.0% 2.1% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3%Domestic services 2.5% 2.3% 2.0% 2.0% 1.8% 1.8% 1.6% 1.5% 1.5% 1.9% 2.0% 1.9%Real estate 2.3% 2.0% 1.7% 1.3% 1.4% 1.2% 1.1% 1.1% 1.1% 0.3% 1.0% 0.9%Less imputed banking charges -3.1% -3.1% -3.1% -3.3% -3.0%; -3.1% -3.2% -3.0% -3.3% -3.3% -3.7% -3.7%TOTAL GDP (current 1% m.) 2069 2255 2650 3224 4049 4657 5432 5649 6227 6957 7271 8235
Note: Ail data sorted by 1985-88 averages.
Source: Calculated from CSO, Quarterly Digest of Statistics (March 1989).
APPEND!Xs ALTERNATIVE EXCHANGE RATE CONCEPTS AND METHODS
The historical real exchange rate approach as used in this paper 
is not the only available method to estimate the value of foreign 
exchange. For those interested in pursuing the exchange-rate 
issue in greater depth, this appendix reviews the most relevant 
aspects of exchange rate theory. Much of this material is 
available in the references cited here, but is condensed and 
applied to the Zimbabwean case for the convenience of the reader.
A1. Alternative exchange rate concepts
The starting place for any discussion of the exchange rate must 
be a definition of terms. In addition to the concepts used in 
the body of this paper, several other concepts will be useful. 
These are briefly outlined here.
Ai.1 The nominal effective exchange rate
From the point of view of the economy as a whole, foreign 
exchange is hot just pula, or pounds, or U.S. dollars. It is all 
of these, in proportion to their use in imports and exports. And 
since the exchange rates between these currencies change every 
day, economists sometimes calculate a nominal effective exchange 
rate (NEER), by adding up the exchange rates with all major 
currencies, multiplying each one by its share in trade. In the 
Zimbabwean case, the official exchange rate is already being set 
in reference to a basket of foreign currencies, in effect 
targeting a particular NEER. But this remains a nominal rate 
which applies only to money, without being corrected for 
inflation. It does not correspond to the costs of real goods, 
and therefore cannot be the basis for a measure of opportunity costs.
A1.2 The real effective exchange rate
In the simplest definition of "real effective" exchange rate, 
"effective11 is used in the above sense as a trade-weighted basket 
of currencies, while the term "real" is used in the sense of 
being deflated by some index of domestic inflation. Thus, a 
"real effective exchange rate" (REER) is calculated as a weighted 
average of several nominal exchange rates, deflated by relative 
inflation in each currency. This calculation is similar in 
nature to the purchasing power parity approach discussed below, 
in section A2.5. It is easy to implement this method, so it is 
often encountered. For the major OECD countries, REERs are 
published regularly by the lnternational Monetary Fund in 
International Financial Statistics (IFS). In Zimbabwe, an 
unpublished REER index is calculated by the Reserve Bank.
A1.3 The real effective exchange rate again
An alternative definition of the real effective rate is as a 
measure of the private opportunity costs of foreign exchange, for 
the producers of particular exports or import-substitutes. This 
is calculated by including ail of the transfers, both government 
subsidies and private rents, associated with producing or 
consuming each type of product.
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In Zimbabwe, many exporters (who sell -foreign exchange to the 
Reserve Bank) receive a subsidy for doing so. These exporters' 
private opportunity cost of foreign exchange (REERx) is really 
the value of forex at the OER (in the sense of Z$/p), plus that 
percentage subsidy (s). But this subsidy differs for different 
goods, so for each item there is:
REERx ± s OER + s*
The export subsidy (st ) is obtained, as in many other countries, 
from three main sources: a foreign-exchange Export RevolvingFund (ERF) to provide import licenses for the import content of 
ail confirmed export orders (provided it does not exceed 60’/. of 
the export value): an ERF Bonus Scheme, to provide import 
licenses for general use up to 25% of incremental export 
earnings? and a local-currency Export Incentive Scheme giving 
tax-free Zimbabwe-dollar bounties equal to 9% of export 
earnings.1 In addition, some exporters may be able to engage in 
under-invoicing, an illegal but easy practice in which an 
exporter remits to the Reserve Bank only a portion of actual 
export earnings, and uses the rest as foreign currency.
At the same time, importers (who buy forex), must usually pay 
customs duties and a surtax, plus occasional fees and other 
taxes. Illustrative examples for agricultural inputs are given 
in the table below.
TABLE Al. IMPORT TAXES ON SELECTED AGRICULTURAL INPUTS, 1989
Tyres
Chemicals 
& Fertilizers
Machinery 
& Spares
Duty 25c/kg
Surtax 20% 20% 5%
Total Tariff (t j) 20%+25c/kg 20% 5%
Source: Commercial Farmers' Union.
As above, the total tariff on each item (tj> can be added to the 
OER to get importers opportunity cost of forex (REERm,, ) . But 
importers must also obtain import licences, which are scarce and therefore valuable. They give importers the right to import a 
good at a cost which is still below what other buyers would be 
willing and able to pay. The lucky importer can then either 
resell the item (quickly, or sometimes much later), or use it to 
make something else for resale. In most caseis, these sales are
*. These programmes are summarized bv the Reserve Bank (1988).
covered by enforced price controls, so the transfer is passed on 
to the buyers, who have received the item for less than they 
would be willing and able to pay.
In either case, import licenses attract a rent, which is Captured 
by the recipients of those licenses (if price controls are not 
enforced) or by those who buy from them (if they are). The only 
imported items which do not attract such a rent are those for 
which there is no shortage of import licenses, which is 
essentially only petroleum products imported by the parastatal 
NQCZIM. For most imports, however, some rent (r,) should also be 
included, yielding!
REERm^ s OER + t, + r,
The REER s are calculated from the point of view of ah exporter or importer, but since there is at least some substitutability 
between goods, the trader s price soon extends to ail similar 
goods whether the item itself is actually exported or not. Thus, 
the REER s apply not only to traded goods, but also to tradable 
items which are similar but may not, in fact, be imported or 
exported.
For example, some Zimbabwean furniture is exported, and a subsidy 
tSi) is available to exporters from the Export Revoilving Fund 
and the Export Incentive Scheme. This leads furniture manufacturers to sell more abroad and less locally: the local
price of furniture rises to the Botswana price converted at the 
OER, plus the subsidy received by the exporter. This situation 
also holds in the markets for other Zimbabwean products, such as 
tyres, televisions and refrigerators, which are occasionally 
found in neighbouring countries "cheaper" (at the official 
exchange rate) than they are within Zimbabwe.
For imports, a similar situation applies. Import tariffs, plus 
the quota rents on import licenses, raise the cost of imports, 
which then extend to substitute items that may be produced 
domestically. The amount of the import tariff (t,> is received 
by the government on the quantities actually imported, while the 
domestic producers of similar items receive that amount as a 
portion of their total rent. The remaining import-licence rent 
r (r,) is collected by both importers and domestic producers, or is 
passed on to the consumers of their goods.
An example for importables would be paper supplies. There is 
considerable domestic production, which is protected by the 
tariffs at the level of OER+t,. But domestic supply at this 
price is limited, so both domestic and imported paper is usually valued at the even higher price of OER+t^+r, . The rent (rj ) is 
shared amongst all sellers and buyers of paper, while the tariff 
(tj> is captured by the government only on the quantities 
actually imported, and by domestic buyers and sellers on the
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domestically-produced quatities. All these transfers, including 
both tariffs and reruB, are paid by the consumers of paper 
products. Additional costs are paid, however, by the producers 
o-f other goods, who -face higher input costs and lower product 
demand because of the restrictions on trade in paper.
There are several striking -features o-f this exchange rate system. 
Firstly, it gives much lower bene-fits to the producers o-f exports 
(s4 ) than to the producers o-f import-substitutes (tj+r, >. This 
gives a strong import-substitut ion or inward-looking bias to the 
trade policy, tending to close c-f-f the economy, reducing the 
amount o-f trade. Before UDI when these? Policies were instituted, 
exports accounted -for more than hal-f o-f national income; by the 
mid-1980s they -fell to less than a quarter.® Similar import- substitution policies are common throughout the world, and are 
o-ften quite successful -for a -few years, while producers -find the 
easiest ways to make import-substitutes, and exporters have not 
yet switched out of exporting into other activities.
As time goes on under an import-substitution trade regime, the 
easiest opportunities to replace imports are used up, and more 
and more exporters have switched to producing for the domestic 
market. This creates a shortage of foreign exchange, raising 
costs and making bottlenecks throughout the economy. These 
bottlenecks slow down growth and increase unemployment, as has 
been shown in numerous studies of trade policy throughout the 
world.3 In the Zimbabwean case, the import-substitut ion policy was introduced by the Smith regime in response to the sanctions 
provoked by UDI, and was in fact reasonably successful, from the 
government s point of view, for about a decade. But it became 
very costly in the late 1970s, and was probably a major 
contributor to the declining income of Rhodesians towards the end 
of the war.
A second striking feature of Zimbabwe s trade policy is the 
existence of a wide variety of exchange rates for different
These data are presented in Mlambo (1989), and in the CSO, Quarterly Digest of Statistics.
The pioneering studies in this area were three sets of 
large-scale, multi-country case studies in the late 1960s. These 
focused on industry, using the theory of effective protection 
developed earlier and brought together by Corden (1971). These 
studies are summarized in Little, Scitovsky and Scott (1970), 
Balassa and Associates (1971), Bhagwati (1978), and Krueger 
(1978). The concept of effective protection was applied to the 
agricultural sector somewhat later, in numerous studies as 
summarized in Scandizzo and Bruce (1980).
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goods. This changes incentives amongst them, affecting the mi;< 
of goods producedconsumed. For example, Zimbabwe's current 
set o-f export subsidies rewards new exports at the expense o-f old 
ones,, through the ERF's bonus scheme, thus inducing exporters tend 
to shi-ft out o-f the older exports (such as -furniture) into new 
ones (such as horticulture). In addition, only exporters who 
successfully, apply to the government for these benefits can 
receive them. , Ordinary farmers and other small-scale producers 
are generally not assisted.
Thirdly, it is notable that the highest subsidies on importables 
are- very high, higher even than the black-market foreign exchange 
premium. This suggests that trade policy is not just influencing 
the supply and demand of foreign exchange, but is also 
distributing excess profits (in the form of rents on import 
licenses) to particular firms and industries. In general, goods 
produced by large industrial firms, such as bicycles and motor 
cars, receive the highest rents. These rents are captured by the 
firms themselves and the few consumers who receive the goods at 
their controlled prices, while the rents are paid by all other 
consumers and potential consumers of these goods, along with the 
producers of all other goods. The recipients of these rents are 
few and relatively well-off, while the payers of the rents are 
many and poorer, so these transfers have a strongly negative 
effect on income distribution.
A1.4 The shadow exchange rate
Because each good has a different REER, the REER concept does not 
directly provide a useful measure of the nation-wide opportunity- 
cost value of foreign exchange. However, in the 1960s and 1970s 
the concept, of the shadow exchange rate (SER) was developed, for 
the purposes of project appraisal. The SER is usually defined as 
the contribution to national income4 made by an additional unit of foreign exchange earned, saved, or consumed: it this
increment then affects the entire market for forex, the SER can 
be estimated as a weighted average of the gap between the REER s 
and the OER, in which each good s real effective exchange rate 
(REER*) is multiplied by its share of national trade (w*), and 
the absolute value of its price elasticity of export supply or
., Like other shadow prices in project appraisal, the SER 
can also be defined in terms of net savings or government income, 
recommended in the "OECD manual" of Little and Mirrlees (1969), 
or in,terms of total consumption, recommended in the "UNIDO 
Guidelines" of Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen (1972). But the 
definition of shadow price,in terms of ordinary currency (i.e., 
national income) is the most straightforward method, since 
ordinary prices are defined the same way. This is the approach 
recommended by Harberger (1972), and which is most commonly used 
today.
Hi (w REER} 
<w ) OER
import demand (e,)!8
SER s
* 1
Clearly, the importance of each REER in the overall SER is 
proportional to each item's share o-f trade (w4 > and export- or 
import—price elasticity (ej ) « .■ The higher the elasticity (that 
is, the more responsive would be imports or exports to a change 
in price), the more important is the level of the subsidy, 
tariff, or rent which raises the good's REER above the general 
OER. For goods whose price elasticity is close to zero, because 
they face either strict rationing in consumption (currently, for 
example, motor-cars) or severe bottlenecks in production 
(currently cement), a high REER will have little effect on the 
SER. But for goods with substantial price elasticities and large 
weights (such as cotton), the REER will have a significant 
effect.
A major problem with the SER approach lies in estimating all the 
necessary REER, s and q s. In the Zimbabwean context, the most 
important imported goods have been subject to enforced price 
controls tor over twenty years, so that their levels of rent (for 
the REER* 's) and trade elasticities (for the q s) could never 
reliably be estimated. This problem is shared by the closely- related "elasticities" approach, discussed in section 2.3.1 
below.
A2. Equilibrium exchange rate concepts
To understand what lies behind the market for foreign exchange, 
some model of its demand and supply is needed, resulting in a 
concept of an equilibrium exchange rate. The first step in 
modeling the equilibrium exchange rate is to note that there are 
two fundamentally distinct markets for foreign exchange. One, 
the market for trade in real goods and services, responds 
primarily to the relative prices of these goods. The other 
market,is for financial assets, which is influenced primarily by 
the relative returns to capital in different currencies. In the 
balance of payments accounts, the former is known as the "current 
account," while the latter is the "capital" account. By 
definition, all foreign exchange transactions are included in one 
or the other account; therefore, the sum of the balance on the 
current account (BCUR) and the balance on the capital account 
(BCAP) must be equal to the change in the government's net 
reserves of foreign currency (-RES), if any.
BCUR + BCAP s "RES
s . This equation is adapted from Harberger (1972), p. 125.
Since government reserves do not usually change very much 
relative to total trade, at least over a five to ten year time 
horizon, any outflow of foreign exchange on the current account 
(a "current account deficit", dr excess of imports over exports) 
must be balanced by an inflow on the capital account (a "capital 
account surplus", or accumulation of foreign debt).
BCUR ~ -BCAP
For example, the United States is currently running an annual 
trade deficit of around US$150 billion (BCUR = -150), which is 
financed by a capital account surplus of the same magnitude (BCAP 
= +150). To offset these flows, someone else must be in the 
opposite situation; currently, Japan and West Germany provide 
many of the goods in the U.S. trade deficit, while also providing 
many of the loans to pay for them. Zimbabwe is currently running 
a merchandise trade surplus on the order of Z$100 to 200 million 
plus gold exports of over Z$400 million, which are offset by a 
deficit on “invisible" trade (mostly services such as transport) 
and other payments (mostly interest on foreign debt), with small 
capital inflows (mostly government borrowing). But Zimbabwe s 
trade position has been highly variable from year to year, with 
net balances not tar from zero.
Because the balance of payments is an identity and always holds 
true simply by definition of the terms involved, it is rarely 
possible to say that changes on one account "cause" changes on 
the others the current and capital accounts are like Siamese 
twins, and go everywhere together. Any country, at any point in 
time, could fulfill the identity at a wide range of levels, from 
large negative balances on both sides (e.g., the U.S.), to large 
positive ones (e.g., Japan), to relatively small ones which are 
sometimes positive, and sometimes negative (e.g., Zimbabwe).
What determines the level of the balance is the interaction 
between forces affecting the current account, and forces 
affecting the capital account.
A2.1 Demand and supply on the current account
Influence on the current account is dominated by the exchange 
rate, because it is the relative price of foreign versus local 
goods. If the pula/Z$ exchange rate goes down, the Z$ price of 
forex goes up, raising the cost of imports and the value of 
exports relative to other goods. This tends to reduce the 
consumption of imports and increase the production of exports, 
putting pressure on the current account balance to improve 
(increase a surplus, or reduce a deficit). This is shown in 
Figure A1 below.
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Figure ftl: Demand and suppIv of -forex on the current account
\ /Sx....,\../ (“high" price, trade surplus)
\ /
/\..../..\ ("low" price, trade deficit)
/ \Dm
Qty of forex <p>
Sx = Supply of foreign exchange through exports
Dm — Demand for foreign exchange through imports
These curves are not permanently fixed in place. Their position 
is influenced by such factors as domestic income (if this rises, 
Dm will shift out and Sx will shift in as more goods are demanded 
locally); the terms of trade (if export prices rise, Sx will 
shift out, while if import prices rise, Dm will shift in*; the 
country's import policies (if tariffs, quotas, and the allocation 
of import licenses becomes more restrictive, Dm will shift in); 
the country's export policies (if incentives are expanded, Sx 
will shift out); and the available technology (if this improves, 
Sx will shift out). However, none of these things changes very 
quickly or easily. What changes most often is Zimbabwean 
inflation, relative to the price of foreign exchange on the 
vertical axis. If Zimbabwean inflation rises faster than the 
nominal price of forex on the vertical axis, the whole Dm and Sx 
cross will shift up, reducing the trade surplus or making a 
bigger deficit. The same effect would occur if the nominal price 
of forex falls, relative to Zimbabwean inflation.
How much the trade balance responds to a change in the exchange 
rate depends on the slopes of the curves, which are influenced by 
such factors as the mobility of labour in the economy, the 
responsiveness of the financial system, and the availability of 
intermediate inputs such as capital goods and equipment spares. 
The more mobility and flexibility there is in the economy, the 
flatter will be the curves, and the less adjustment in the 
exchange rate will be needed to achieve a given change in the 
trade balance.
In most countries, there is little reason to expect the balance 
of trade to be zero; as long as the country is willing and able 
to borrow or lend foreign exchange, it is perfectly reasonable to 
have a trade deficit or surplus, and to use an inflow or outflow 
of capital to offset the current account deficit or surplus. 
However, the link between the current and capital account imposes 
a limit to the country s options.
price
offorex
(Z*/p)
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A2.2 Deaand and supply on the capital account
In contrast to tho current account, capital -flows consist largely 
o-f loans, -from one currency into another. Many capital flows, 
especially in Zimbabwe, are relatively fixed, such as foreign aid 
or migrants assets. But these are fairly small. A larger 
portion is the Zimbabwe government's own foreign borrowing, plus 
the net borrowing and lending of companies and individuals. 
Government borrowing is a function of the budget deficit, minus 
local borrowing and money supply growth. These variables are 
fixed by government policy. The most flexible part of capital 
flows, in general, is private ’ending. This responds to the 
returns available in different countries: the'real interest
rates currently available in each currency, adjusted for any 
expected changes in that rate over the life of the loan, the 
.relative risks of default, and regulations on capital movements.
df these influences, risks and regulations are hard to change and 
stay relatively constants what is most flexible is the expected 
real interest rate differential between Zimbabwe and foreign 
countries. This is the expected real interest rate in Zimbabwe 
(the expected nominal interest rate corrected for inflation), 
relative to the expected real interest rate in foreign 
currencies. Mathematically, there is:
(l + r21m >
= — '— -—  - 1 
(1 + i ztm>
< 3 +rFnr >
(1 + i F c5r~)
and:
h*\* real
.1 1
where r is the expected interest rate and i is the expected 
inflation rate in both Zimbabwe dollars (21m ) and foreign 
currency (Pc"' ) . The expected interest rate differential (la,*) is 
thus:
f' d l  -f
<i+ivMl ’ror')
1
The link between the interest rate differentia1 and capital flows is shown in the following diagram:
Figure A2: Demand and supply of -forex on the capital account
\ /Sin
•, • • » ■ • a / • "high" interest rate (capital inflow)
f'di-f \//\ . "low" interest rate (capital outflow)
/ \Dout
Qty o-f -fore:-; (p>Sin = Supply of foreign exchange' from capital inflows 
Dout = Demand for foreign exchange in capital outflows
Like the current account demand and supply curves, these curves 
are not fixed in place. Their position is influenced by such 
factors as flows of foreign aid and government borrowing 
(increases will shift out Sin), perceived risks of default 
(increased risks will shift back Sin and shift out Dout), rules 
about capital transact ions, and a sense of trust and security in 
the country. In addition, the slopes of the curves are 
influenced by the flexibility of the financial system and the 
ease of making transactions (again, more flexible conditions 
yield a flatter curve).
As noted earlier, although the current account balance must be 
equal and opposite to the capital account balance, this can occur 
at any level of balances. There is simply a strong positive 
relationship between the price of forex (along with other 
influences on the trade balance) and the interest rate (along 
with other influences on capital flows): upward pressure on one
of them puts upward pressure on the other.
In this context, it is clear that an "equilibrium" exchange rate 
can only be defined as a rate at which the resulting trade and 
capital flow balance is "sustainable" or "desirable": that is,
where the country s capital-account borrowing (lending) can 
reliably be paid back (recovered) out of future trade surpluses 
(deficits) at the country s normal savings rate. Some countries 
will want to borrow very little, while others will borrow a lot: 
and the more that is borrowed, the higher the interest rate which 
must be paid to finance the loans.
Most countries move through long cycles of trade-deficits-with- 
capital-borrowing (when they have little domestic capital and 
interest rates are high), to trade-surpluses-with-capitai-lending 
(.when they have a lot of domestic capital and interest rates are 
low). But countries are never locked in to a particular 
situation; they can always move themselves, at some cost in terms 
of the exchange rate and/or the interest rate, to a higher or 
lower balance position. These costs can be considerable, 
however: holding a "high" exchange rate to make imports cheap
will also make a "high" interest rate, which will reduce domestic
consumption of goods and services/
In summary, the "equilibrium" exchange rate is inevitably a 
subjective notion. It is better to speak of a "target" exchange 
rate (or current account balanced, and its associated "target" 
interest rate (or capital account balance). Considering the 
capital account to be fixed, then the target exchange rate is 
that which will allow the current-account balance to reach that 
target without forcing the government to limit the number of 
import licenses. This will also be the SER seen earlier, or the 
marginal national opportunity cost of foreign exchange at the 
current, level of balances. In other words, it is the exchange 
rate at which Zimbabwe, all other things constant, would expand 
the supply of exports and reduce demand for imports enough to end 
the shortage of foreign exchange for current-account 
transactions. At this rate, anybody would be able to order 
foreign goods and services through commercial banks, as people do 
in countries with "convertible" currencies. Only the constraints 
on capital flows would remain.
Two distinct types of methods have been devised to find the level 
of such a target equilibrium exchange rate. These are 
elasticities approaches, in which the responsiveness of exports 
and imports to exchange rate changes is measured, and index 
number approaches, in which changes in overall average price 
levels over time are measured. Using index numbers, there are 
again two possibilities: one can either compare relative prices
in Zimbabwe with prices elsewhere using the purchasing power
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*. The reduction in consumption which follows from a rise in interest rates can be seen through the national income 
identity, in which total national production (GNF‘) by definition 
always equals the sum of consumption (C), investment (I), 
government expenditure (G) , and exports minus imports (X-li) .
GNF‘ s C + I + G + X-M
A further identity is that all investment (I) must be financed by 
’ sayings, either domestic (3d) or" from foreign sources (Sf), where 
Sf is simply net capital inflows from abroad. Since Sf always 
offsets X-M, we can rewrite the identity as:
6NP S C  + Sd + S
Therefore, for a given level of national product (GNP) and 
government spending (G), an increase in interest rates which 
attracts savings.(increasing Sd) will thereby reduce Consumption 
(C); other adjustments, changing G and GNP themselves, may also 
follow. The desired levels of these variables, associated with a 
particular interest rate and les-el of savings, is sometimes known 
as 1 internal balance." This contrasts with the desired level of 
trade and capital flows, which is known as "external balance." 
Thus, finding a desired combination of interest and exchange 
rates 'is sometimes known as finding a desired internal and 
external balance. ,
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parity approach, nr compare relative prices within Zimbabwe using 
the real exchange rate approach.
A2.3 The elasticities approachThe elasticities approach to.a target equilibrium exchange rate 
is closely related to the shadow exchange rate (SER) method 
described earlier. Like the SER, the elasticities approach 
begins by noting that an additional unit of -foreign exchange can 
be obtained either -from more exports, or -from saving imports.
But instead o-f beginning with the forex and calculating its Z$ 
value, the elasticities approach begins with the domestic 
economy, and asks how much o-f a change in the official exchange 
rate (OER) would be needed to induce a change in exports and 
imports sufficient to reach the a target change in the current 
account balance.
In terms of Zimbabwe dollars, the change in foreign exchange 
availability which can be expected from a given change in the 
exchange rate depends on the current levels of exports (X) and 
imports (M) and the elasticities of export supply (e„) and import 
demand (em), according to the following identity, where the 
apostrophe ( ) indicates a percentage change in the variable, and 
as before the '• indicates an absolute change.:7
fSCUR s. (OER )C(X(l+eM> + M(em-1)3
A given percent change in the exchange rate will yield a change 
in the supply of foreign exchange which is proportional to the 
current levels of trade <X and M), and the flexibility of the 
economy in changing between domestic consumption and trade 
(measured by eH and ^  ;. The SER is simply an alternative
7. This identity is adapted from Schafer (1989), and can be derived as follows. Firstly, note that any changes in forex 
earnings as measured in forex COER( ’BCA) 3 can come from either 
changes in the forex value of old trade C 0ER(X-M)3, or changes 
in trade measured at the new forex value COER (• X + ' M) 3 .
OER,( ;-BCUR) s -OER(X-M) + OER (• X+‘ M) (1)
To find the 1% equivalent of the change in forex availability, we 
divide equation (1) by the OER, and then grouping the X and M terms, we get:
•BCUR s (OER )X + -X - (OER >M + - M (2)
Separating out the percentage change in the exchange rate from 
the other terms on the right hand side, we get:
5 (GER')CX + "XU/OER > - M + -'ti (1/OER ) 3 (3)
Separating out the X,and M terms, we get:
s (OER') CX(1+CX /OER 3 + M <1+CM'/OER'3)> (4)
Now, the terms in square brackets are the percentage change in 
exports and imports which can be expected from a percent change 
in their price, or eK and respectively. Equation (4) is
therefore the identity given in the text.
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version of this same equation, in which the target current- 
iccoun't balance tn assumed "to be unchanged. Similarly to the 
SER, i+' the values of the elasticities were known, the change in 
the exchange rate needed to obtain the desired change in the 
current account balance could be calculated. This new exchange 
rate' would then be the target equilibrium exchange rate.
The elasticities could be estimated directly, i-f there were a 
history of changing exchange rates against which to compare 
changes in exports and imports. But often there is either too 
little change in the exchange rate, or too many other -factors 
intervening in determining yeat— to-year trade volumes (because 
the export supply and import demand curves are shifting from side 
to side> so that it is sometimes easier to break down the trade 
elasticities into their components: the domestic elasticities of
supply (es) and demand <ed) for the exports <*> and imports <„, > 
involved. This yields:
esM (edH+l> edm (esm+l>
edM-es* esm-ed,
In many countries, it is possible to estimate these domestic elasticities, and thereby calculate an estimate for the overall 
elasticity of foreign exchange supply. In other cases, it may be 
possible to borrow elasticities from similar countries. For 
example, elasticities from one large South American country might 
be used in studies of another, or elasticities from one small 
East Asian country might be applied to a small Caribbean country.
In Zimbabwe, however, it is very difficult to estimate 
elasticities directly, due to the price controls and 
administrative allocation systems which have been in place since 
the late 1960s. These controls have limited the amount of change 
in relative prices against which to measure changes in production 
and consumption. In addition, bottlenecks and rationing 
elsewhere in the economy have limited responsiveness to what 
price changes have taken place, making the calculation of 
elasticities even more difficult. At the Same time, borrowing 
elasticities would be risky, because of the absence of suitably 
comparable countries with more available data. In consequence, 
there have been very few attempts to use the elasticities or the 
SER approach in Zimbabwe, although both are widely used 
elsewhere.
Instead of using elasticities to measure the responsiveness of 
exports and imports to exchange rate changes, it is possible to i 
view the exchange rate as influencing a wide range of prices in 
the economy, which can all be aggregated together into index 
numbers. Changes over time in these index numbers can then be 
'used to see the impact of exchange rate changes in the economy. 
Each individual component of the index will be influenced by
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supply and demand in khe market -for that particular good, but the 
influence of the exchange rate will still be visible on the 
aggregate over many goods.
A2.4 The purchasing-power parity approachThe earliest index-number method is derived from the hypothesis 
that the prices of things in various countries tend to be equaiizeda in other words, that purchasing-power parity (PPP) 
between various currencies tends to be maintained. This 
aggregate version of the classical “law of one price" (which 
states that the prices of individual goods tend to be equalized), 
implies that percentage changes in any price index such as a 
consumer price index (CPI) calculated in both in foreign currency 
(CPI*> and in domestic currency (CPI^  ) , when converted into 
foreign currency (at QER) , would remain equal over time (* ) :
CPI*,* ' - OES ♦CPI*,*
Several empirical studies have been undertaken to see whether 
purchasing power parity is, in fact, maintained over time between 
various countries, and for various goods. Almost all results have shown that purchasing power parity is in general not 
maintained; only for a few primary commodities, which are 
virtually identities! everywhere and are easily traded, do prices 
in various countries actually move together.
One reason for deviations from purchasing-power parity could be 
that countries have disequilibrium exchange rates sustained 
through rationing and imbalances of various kinds. In this case, 
the year-to-year changes in their target equilibrium rate could 
be estimated using the above equation. The equation could be 
solved in each year, to find the level of a purchasing power 
parity rate index (PPPi) which would maintain constant parity 
between the two price indeces:
CPI*,* ' s (PPPi ') (CPI *.* )
This equation determines the year-to-year percentage changes in 
the PPP index. The absolute level of a target parity-maintaining 
equilibrium exchange rate (PPPe) in any one year would depend on the desired level of the balance of trace and also on the other 
factors influencing the trade balance, as discussed earlier. To 
find the current target level, there are two basic options.
The easiest option is to choose some past year s exchange rate 
lor, as in this paper, an average of several past years) as the 
target rate, and simply assume that all the influences on the 
current account balance other than the exchange rate are more or
. These results are reviewed and summarized in Schafer(1989).
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less unchanged since then. In this case the PPP index is re­
scaled to equal i-minal exchange rate in that year, thereby
re-de-fining PPPi to equal PPPe.
A more difficult option is to -formulate a model o-f the influences 
on the balance of trade and the PPP index, including variables, 
such as per capita income, the terms of trade, foreign aid or 
other fixed capital flows, government borrowing from abroad, and 
growth of the money supply. The model is then estimated 
econometrically to determine the influence of each variable on 
the index. To find the target PPPe level of the index, the 
influence of any disequilibrium variables ("excess" borrowings 
and "excess" money supply growth) is removed. But there are 
several problems with such models.
Firstly, the estimated coefficients of such models are quite 
error— prone, because the explanatory variables all tend to move 
together (there is multicollinearity amongst them). Secondly, 
the choice of model specification is is fairly arbitrary, since 
there are many influences on the foreign exchange market which 
are inevitably missing from the model. And finally, the judgment 
about which variables contribute to disequilibrium conditions, 
and which are the fundamental elements of the economy, is also 
arbitrary. These problems make formal modeling much better 
suited to comparative studies of a large number of countries, 
than to single-country studies such as this one. Most country 
studies simply refer to a historical level of the PPP index as 
the target level, and assume that the major influences on the 
desired trade balance other chan the exchange rate are held 
constant.
Whether an econometric model or a historical reference is used, 
however, there are many possible criticisms of the PPP method. 
They can all be boiled down to the problem that the goods in the 
domestic and foreign indeces are, in fact, not the same. There 
are both subjective and objective differences amongst goods from 
different countries, such that there is ample scope for changes 
in relative prices. The other side of this coin is that some 
goods are never traded, and because those goods which are traded 
are not strictly identical, the prices of the non-traded goods 
are not equalised. Consequently, the PPP exchange rate fails to 
detect the shifts in domestic relative prices between imports,, 
exports, and other goods. It is only useful when the overall 
level of domestic prices has become very different from foreign 
prices, as has happened in many Latin American countries.
Zimbabwe, however, is a dramatic example of the limitations of 
the PPP approach, as was shown in Fiugure 4a and 4b where these 
indeces are compared.
A2.5 The real exchange rate approachAlthough the PPP method is sometimes described as calculating a 
"real" (that is, corrected -for inflation) exchange rate, it might 
better be called a tyoe of nominal exchange rate, since it measures a price between two currencies -for what is, at least in 
principle, essentially the same set of goods. 1 he real exchange 
rate (RER) as discussed in the -first part o-f this paper is more 
truly a "real" rate, since it measures the relative price o-f two 
feinds o-f goods, in the- same currency.
In th.is'paper, the RER approach is implemented only on a 
historical basis, with reference to the pre-Independence level o-f 
relative prices... It would also be possible, however, to build a 
model o-f the determinants of the real exchange rate. This would 
include national income, the terms o-f trade, capital flows, the 
levels of capital investment and knowledge (or technology) in the 
country, and several other factors. These would be the 
"equilibrium" influences on the RER. Additional "disequilibrium" 
influences on the RER, however* would be changes in government 
policy such as trade restrictions, official borrowing, growth in 
the money supply, and minimum wage laws. Similarly to the PPP 
approach, tt e vDefficients on each variable in such a model would 
be estimater1 =><-onometrical ly, and the value of, the RER in the 
absence of - "disequilibrium" factors would be predicted. The 
problems of 1 ticol 1 inearity, omitted variables, and arbitrary
definition f J ne disequilibrium influences mentioned in the PPP 
case all pe ~t, however, and are at their most severe in a 
country suc.i as Zimbabwe, where price adjustments have been 
extremely complex.9
( ••
. An excellent multi-country comparative study for Africa using the n-'^ ci.ing approach is Schafer (1989), using variants of 
both PPP and RER indeces. Zimbabwe was not included iri that 
study, however, perhaps because ot a relative lack of data.
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